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Providing Location-Aware Location Privacy Protection for Mobile
Location-Based Services
Yu Wang , Dingbang Xu, and Fan Li
Abstract: Location privacy has been a serious concern for mobile users who use location-based services provided
by third-party providers via mobile networks. Recently, there have been tremendous efforts on developing new
anonymity or obfuscation techniques to protect location privacy of mobile users. Though effective in certain
scenarios, these existing techniques usually assume that a user has a constant privacy requirement along spatial
and/or temporal dimensions, which may be not true in real-life scenarios. In this paper, we introduce a new
location privacy problem: Location-aware Location Privacy Protection (L2P2) problem, where users can define
dynamic and diverse privacy requirements for different locations. The goal of the L2P2 problem is to find the
smallest cloaking area for each location request so that diverse privacy requirements over spatial and/or temporal
dimensions are satisfied for each user. In this paper, we formalize two versions of the L2P2 problem, and propose
several efficient heuristics to provide such location-aware location privacy protection for mobile users. Through
extensive simulations over large synthetic and real-life datasets, we confirm the effectiveness and efficiency of the
proposed L2P2 algorithms.
Key words: location privacy; k-anonymity; cloaking algorithm; location-based service; mobile networks

1

Introduction

In recent years, extensive media reports about modern
smart phones (i.e., Android phones and iPhones) being
able to store and gather users’ location data have
attracted national attention, and even the lawmakers
from the congress expressed their concerns[1] . The
privacy concerns from mobile users on location data
have significant impact on usage and development of
Location-Based Service (LBS) applications and mobile
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systems.
LBS is a type of service where the information
is provided based on a mobile user’s geographical
location. Now, mobile devices with positioning
capabilities (such as smart phones, watches, bracelet,
and tablets) have been extensively used in our
daily lives. These devices and various mobile apps
provide great convenience to millions of users
via LBS, such as discovering the nearest banking
cash machine, performing location-based mobile
sensing[2] , receiving coupons from near-by shops,
or identifying human activities[3] . In addition, with
exchanging location information with other devices or
service providers, location-based networking protocols
can further improve communication efficiency[4–6] .
However, privacy issues have been a big concern when
location data has to leave local devices to a third-party
for LBS. The broadcast nature of wireless networks
usually makes it challenging to protect a user’s privacy
including identities and locations. Location data is
sensitive since it can reveal where you live and work,
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where you go for movies, dinner, and vacation, and
even if you stay at someone else’s house. As defined by
Beresford and Stajano in Ref. [7], location privacy is
“the ability to prevent other parties from learning one’s
current or past location”. In an example scenario of
LBS application, a mobile user may issue an LBS query
“where is the closest Bank of America branch?”. From
privacy protection perspective, this user may not want to
disclose his identity, nor his exact location information,
especially when the service is sensitive, but he still
wants to get the query resolved by LBS providers.
Therefore, location privacy has been a great challenge
for location-based services in mobile environment.
Over the past few years, many different approaches
have been proposed to protect a user’s location privacy,
for example, Gruteser and Grunwald’s k-anonymity
based approach[8] , where a cloaking area in which
at least k users are present is provided, and Xu and
Cai’s entropy-based approach[9] , where a cloaking
area is decided based on multiple users’ footprints
in the area. Generally speaking, the approaches to
protecting location privacy can be roughly divided
into four categories: (1) regulatory approaches, (2)
privacy policy based approaches, (3) anonymitybased approaches, and (4) obfuscation-based
approaches. Anonymity-based approaches separate
users’ identities from their location information, e.g.,
a user’s identity may be replaced with pseudonyms[7] .
Obfuscation-based approaches downgrade the quality
of users’ location information to protect location
privacy, e.g., a cloaking area (instead of the user’s exact
location) may be reported based on multiple users’
footprints in the region[9] . In this paper, we focus on
designing cloaking area based approaches.
Though effective in certain scenarios, most of these
existing techniques usually assume that a user has a
constant privacy requirement, which may be not true
in certain real-life scenarios. In real world, different
locations or different types of LBS requests may reveal
different private information of the mobile user, thus
the user may have diverse privacy requirements over
various locations and/or with the change of date and
time. For example, in the spatial dimension, a user
may have higher privacy requirement when she/he is
in a hospital compared with the case when she/he is
in a shopping mall; and in the temporal dimension,
a user may have higher privacy requirement in a
workday morning compared with the case in a weekend
afternoon due to the specialty of her/his job. From
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these, we can see that addressing a user’s diverse and
dynamic privacy requirements which may depend on
the time and location information would be necessary
for location privacy protection in mobile location-based
services.
In this paper, we introduce and investigate a new
location privacy problem: Location-aware Location
Privacy Protection (L2P2) problem, which addresses
the dynamic and diverse privacy requirements from
mobile users. We assume that a mobile user can have
diverse and dynamic location privacy requirements,
depending on where or when the user requests a
location-based service. Each LBS request is associated
with a specific privacy requirement, and we generate
a cloaking area to fulfill this requirement. Notice that
privacy requirements can be expressed through either kanonymity or entropy based metrics, and our approach
can accommodate both. To be more specific, for kanonymity based metric, if the privacy requirement is k,
the cloaking area should have at least k users including
the user makes the request; for entropy-based metric,
the footprint frequencies from multiple users in the
cloaking area can be used to compute a privacy value,
and this value should be no less than the requirement.
We will give the formal definitions for both metrics in
Section 3.
Considering that mobile users can have a sequence of
LBS requests to make the scenarios more complicated,
to tackle this, we further define two versions of L2P2
problems: basic L2P2 and enhanced L2P2. In basic
L2P2, each user request can be seen as an independent
event. To generate a cloaking area, all users in the area
are considered during the calculation of privacy values,
and the privacy value provided by the cloaking area
should be equal to or larger than the requirement. We
provide a simple cloaking area generation algorithm to
find the minimum-sized cloaking areas. In enhanced
L2P2, since a sequence of LBS requests will generate a
sequence of cloaking areas, we choose a conservative
approach in favor of privacy protection. To be more
specific, we enforce a much stronger restriction, where
only the common users among this sequence of
cloaking areas are considered for computing privacy
values. This restriction comes from the possibility that
an attacker may be able to shorten the list of possible
users through discovering the common users in a
sequence of cloaking areas. Existing cloaking methods
do not work for this problem, since the privacy values
of the sequence of cloaking areas are not independent
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any more. To address this enhanced L2P2 problem,
we propose four different heuristics to generate the
cloaking areas in polynomial time. All proposed
algorithms can provide diverse privacy protection for
multiple users over both temporal and spatial domains
to fulfill the mobile scenarios. In addition, in order
to evaluate our approach, we also conduct extensive
simulations over large sets of mobile user location
data (both synthetic data generated by a networkbased traffic generator[10] for Oldenberg, Germany and
real-life GPS traces of thousands of taxis in Beijing,
China[11, 12] ). Results show that our methods can fulfill
diverse privacy requirements with slight downgrade of
the quality of original location data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews related work on location privacy.
Section 3 introduces the model and assumptions used
in our study, and the newly defined location-aware
location privacy protection problem. To address this
problem, Section 4 presents a set of algorithms.
Section 5 shows our simulation results and Section 6
concludes the paper. A preliminary version of this paper
was appeared in Ref. [13].

2

Related Work

To protect location privacy, many approaches have
been proposed[7–9, 14–22] . According to Ref. [23],
these approaches can be divided into four categories:
(1) regulatory approaches, (2) privacy policy based
approaches, (3) anonymity-based approaches, and (4)
obfuscation-based approaches, where regulatory
approaches are those related to making rules,
regulations, and legislations to protect privacy,
privacy policies are those mechanisms that can prohibit
certain misuse of location data, anonymity-based
approaches separate users’ identities from their location
information, and obfuscation-based approaches
downgrade the quality of users’ location information.
In this section, we follow this classification and give an
overview of the approaches in the last two categories.
2.1

Anonymity-based approaches

Beresford and Stajano[7] proposed a framework
of frequently changing a user’s identities through
pseudonyms. Moreover, the concept of mix zones
in anonymous communication has also been applied
to provide location privacy. To measure the location
privacy, two metrics, where one is based on entropy and
the other is based on anonymity sets, are also proposed
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in Ref. [7]. Gruteser and Grunwald[8] proposed a
method using the concept of k-anonymous, in which a
user’s location is reported as a two-dimensional spatial
cloaking area where at least k 1 other users are also
in the same area. A quadtree-based cloaking algorithm
has been designed, and the size of the anonymity set k
is used to measure the degree of anonymity. In Bettini
et al.’s approach[14] , location-based quasi-identifiers are
defined, and based on the concept of historical kanonymity, a formal framework has been proposed to
see the potential risk of location information leading
to the identity disclose. In Kido et al.’s approach[15] ,
dummy location data has been generated and mixed
with real location data, so that it is difficult for the
location-based service providers to differentiate them.
2.2

Obfuscation-based approaches

In a feeling-based approach proposed by Xu and
Cai[9] , a user’s privacy requirement is defined through
specifying a public region (e.g., a restaurant), and
the public region’s popularity is computed through an
entropy-based approach regarding the region’s users
(i.e., visitors) and footprints. A user’s location may
be disclosed in the form of a cloaking box, only if
the disclosed cloaking box’s popularity is equal to or
greater than that of the pre-specified public region.
Xu and Cai[9] further proposed the concept of PPopular Trajectory, which is related to the temporal and
spatial aspects of a mobile (moving) user, and proposed
quadtree-based algorithms to select cloaking sets and
compute cloaking boxes. In this approach, an entropybased metric has been proposed to measure the location
privacy. In another approach[16] , a formal obfuscation
model (with weighted graph) is presented, and a
negotiation algorithm (between users and locationbased service providers) is designed. The size of the
obfuscation set is used to measure the location privacy
in this approach. Notice that it is also possible that
some approaches may belong to both anonymity and
obfuscation categories, such as the approach[8] .
There are also several other location privacy
protection techniques not discussed here. For a
complete survey of location privacy protection, please
refer to Refs. [23, 24]. In this paper, we focus
on designing cloaking area based approaches to
address dynamic and diverse privacy requirements from
mobile users. Notice that Gedik and Liu[25, 26] have
studied personalized k-anonymity, which also supports
personalized privacy requirements. However, they
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focused on spatio-temporal cloaking methods. In this
paper, we assume a fixed unit time and do not consider
temporal cloaking. In addition, our enhanced L2P2 has
more restricted privacy requirements over both spatial
and temporal domains than those in Refs. [25, 26] since
enhanced L2P2 requests k-anonymity over a common
set of mobile users over certain time period, not any
mobile users.

3
3.1

L2P2 for Mobile LBS
Mobile LBS model

We assume a general model for location-based
services (e.g., in Refs. [8, 9]), where there are three
critical components: mobile users, trusted location
anonymization server, and location-based service
providers. See Fig. 1 for illustration. In this model, a
mobile user ui sends a location-based service request
to the trusted anonymization server, which includes
his location data .x; y/, timestamp information t,
as well as his privacy requirement r (a number in
k-anonymity models or a given region in entropybased models defined by the user). Hereafter, we use
.ui ; x; y; t; r/ to represent such request. During this
step, user authentication and message encryption can
be performed to provide security protection. After
the anonymization server gets the request message,
it will perform location anonymization (generating
a cloaking area c which covers the user’s location
.x; y/) to provide location privacy protection, then the
anonymized location information (the cloaking area c)
will be sent to the location-based service providers for
the services. Our focus of this paper is how to perform
location anonymization to fulfill location-aware privacy
requirements at the location anonymization server.
Notice that the location anonymization server (not
necessary a centralized server but a group of distributed
servers) has the location and timestamp information
of all requests from all users, and it uses a footprint
database F (each request will leave a footprint

Fig. 1 LBS model:
Location anonymization server
performs location anonymization via cloaking area
generation to protect privacy of mobile users.
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.ui ; x; y; t / in the database) to save all historical data.
Here, we also assume that the temporal domain is
divided into equal time intervals.
Similar to approaches in Refs. [8, 9], we use
a quadtree T [27] to partition the spatial domain
recursively into cells. A cell at level l is partitioned into
four smaller cells in level l C 1. The partitioning stops
when the size of cells becomes less than a threshold.
Assume that T has L levels. Figure 2a illustrates an
example of such a quadtree. Let j -th cell at level l
be c.j; l/ and its area be a.c.j; l// or a.j; l/. We
assume that all generated cloaking areas by location
anonymization server are cells in the quadtree T . In
other words, for an LBS request at position .x; y/
which is contained at c.j; L/, all possible cloaking
areas of this request are c.j; L/ and its ancestors in T ,
as shown in Fig. 2b. Obviously, smaller cells (at higher
level) provide better quality of location data but with
potentially smaller privacy values because less users
may be involved. Notice that cells in the quadtree could
be rectangles.
3.2

L2P2

The user privacy requirement r included in the LBS
request is given by the user ui , and it could be dynamic
and diverse over both spatial and temporal dimensions.
In other words, it could be treated as a function of
.ui ; x; y; t /. Thus, we call our model location-aware
location privacy. As we discussed in Section 2, mainly
there are two models to measure location privacy
protection: k-anonymity model[8] and entropy-based
model[9] .
Definition 1 k-anonymity privacy (e.g., in Ref.
[8]): Let c represent a cloaking area and U.c/ D
fu1 ; u2 ; : : : ; um g represent the set of users whose
footprints are in c at time t . The k-anonymity privacy
value pk .c/ of c is the size of U.c/, i.e., pk .c/ D m.
Definition 2 Entropy-based privacy (e.g., in Ref.

Fig. 2 Quadtree: (a) The network is recursively partitioned
into a quadtree T; (b) All possible cloaking areas of an LBS
request happened in c. j; L/ are c. j; L/ and its ancestors.
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[9]): Let c denote a cloaking area and U.c/ D
fu1 ; u2 ; : : : ; um g denote the set of users whose
footprints are in c based on a footprint database F .
Let ni represent the number of ui ’s footprints in c, and
P
N D m
i D1 ni represent the total number of footprints
from user set U.c/. The entropy of c is E.c/ D
Pm ni
ni
log , and the popularity privacy value of
i D1
N
N
c is pe .c/ D 2E.c/ .
In both models, for each LBS request .ui ; x; y; t; r/,
the goal of location privacy protection is to find a
cloaking area c such that its privacy value (pk .c/ or
pe .c/) is no less than r. Hereafter, we use p.c/ to
represent the privacy value of either pk .c/ or pe .c/
for cloaking area c. If we only consider a user subset
U 0 .c/  U.c/ instead of all users in U.c/, we can also
define privacy value of c with respect to the subset U 0
0
accordingly, denoted as p U .c/.
Even though we use k-anonymity and entropy based
metrics in our study, our proposed cloaking algorithms
can adopt any privacy measurement to quantify the
location privacy value. Recently, Shokri et al.[28, 29]
showed that k-anonymity and entropy based metrics
are not correlated with the attacker’s success rate,
thus may not be perfect metrics for location privacy.
They also provide a new privacy measurement tool to
quantify location privacy, which could be used by our
proposed cloaking algorithms instead of k-anonymity
and entropy based measurement.
3.3

Optimization problems for L2P2

While the single privacy request is easy to satisfy,
the issue becomes more complicated when a user
makes a sequence of requests in different locations
with different privacy requirements. Now we are
ready to formally define L2P2 problem. When a user
requests a continuous LBS, it sends a sequence of LBS
requests. The location anonymization server generates
a sequence of cloaking areas to provide location privacy

(a) Solution space of L2P2
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protection and sends them to the LBS provider. See
Fig. 3 for illustration. The generated cloaking area
is required to satisfy the following conditions: (1)
it contains the user’s current location; (2) it should
provide enough privacy protection as specified by the
user; and (3) it would be as small as possible. We can
define such a problem as follows.
Definition 3 Basic L2P2: Given a quadtree T , the
footprint database F , and a sequence of LBS requests
from user u in the format of .u; xi ; yi ; ti ; ri / for i D 1
to m, L2P2 techniques generate a sequence of cloaking
areas ci D c.ji ; li / (which are cells in T ) for i D 1 to
m such that
(1) each cloaking area c.ji ; li / includes the user’s
location .xi ; yi / at ti ;
(2) for any cloaking area c.ji ; li /, its privacy value
satisfies the corresponding privacy requirement,
i.e., p.c.ji ; li // > ri ;
P
(3) the total area of all cloaking areas m
i D1 a.ji ; li / is
minimized.
Notice that in basic L2P2, we assume that each user
request ri (1 6 i 6 m) is an independent event among
the request sequence, so this basic L2P2 problem is
easy to address. However, in some cases, simply
satisfying basic L2P2 requirements is not enough for
privacy protection. Note that an attacker may be able
to shorten the list of possible users through discovering
the common users in a sequence of cloaking areas.
Therefore, similar to Ref. [9], to prevent such attacks,
we may want to consider an enhanced version of
L2P2, where only the common users (in a sequence
of cloaking areas) are considered for privacy value
computation inside each cloaking area.
Definition 4 Enhanced L2P2: Given a quadtree
T , the footprint database F , and a sequence of LBS
requests from user u in the format of .u; xi ; yi ; ti ; ri /
for i D 1 to m, enhanced L2P2 generates a sequence of
cloaking areas ci D c.ji ; li / (which are cells in T ) for
i D 1 to m such that

(b) Possible solution of L2P2

Fig. 3 Example of L2P2 problem for a sequence of three requests. (a) All possible cloaking areas for each request; (b) Possible
solution of L2P2 problem in which the privacy values satisfy the privacy requirements.
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(1) each cloaking area c.ji ; li / includes the user’s
location .xi ; yi / at ti ;
(2) for any cloaking area c.ji ; li /, its privacy value
with respect to common user set U 0 satisfies user’s
0
requirement, i.e., p U .c.ji ; li // > ri . Here U 0 is
the set of common users among a sequence of
cloaking areas, i.e., U 0 D \16i 6mP
U.c.ji ; li //;
(3) the total area of all cloaking areas m
i D1 a.ji ; li / is
minimized.
Based on this definition, we can see that enhanced
L2P2 must ensure that the privacy value of each
cloaking area with respect to the common users is
no less than the privacy requirement. This enhances
the location privacy protection for mobile users, but
makes the problem much more challenging. All existing
cloaking algorithms (including Refs. [24, 25]) do not
work for the enhanced L2P2 problem, since the privacy
values of the sequence of cloaking areas are not
independent any more and moving one cloaking area
will affect all others.

4

L2P2 Algorithms

In this section, we present five different cloaking
algorithms to provide location-aware location privacy
protection for a mobile user with a sequence of LBS
requests. For simplicity, we present our algorithms
in offline fashion (with the footprint repository and
m LBS requests as their inputs), but all of them
can be converted into online algorithms by using
the techniques proposed in Ref. [9]. We start with a
simple algorithm to address basic L2P2 problem, then
four more heuristics are proposed for enhanced L2P2
problem.
4.1
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Algorithm 1 shows the detail. The time complexity of
this algorithm is O.mL/.
4.2

Algorithms for enhanced L2P2

While the basic L2P2 is easy to solve, the enhanced
L2P2 becomes more complicated. The major reason
is that only the set of common users in a sequence
of cloaking areas would be considered for computing
privacy metrics. This can provide better location privacy
protection for mobile users, however, it also makes
the problem of L2P2 at location anonymization server
much more challenging. In enhanced L2P2, whether
a cloaking area for request ri can be satisfied is also
dependent on the other requests in this sequence, since
the privacy value of such a cloaking area is calculated
with respect to the common users inside all cloaking
areas generated from a request sequence. In such
situation, moving the cloaking area along one branch
of a quadtree for one request will affect the privacy
values of cloaking areas at other branches for other
requests. In other words, to increase the privacy value
of a cloaking area ci of request ri , we can either expand
the cloaking area of such request by moving it up toward
the root node in the quadtree, or expand the cloaking
areas of other requests, which may enlarge the common
user set. Therefore, how to dynamically and efficiently
generate the cloaking areas for a sequence of LBS
requests is very challenging. The issues, such as what
leaf nodes we should start and what stopping criteria we
should have, require more thorough investigation. We
certainly can try a brute force method, which examines
all combinations and chooses an optimal one, but it
will lead to the complexity of O.Lm /. To simplify
the computation, it is usually necessary to have some

Algorithm for basic L2P2

For the basic L2P2 problem, it is easy to find the
optimal solution within polynomial time. Since each
LBS request .u; xi ; yi ; ti ; ri / is an independent event
in the request sequence, we can simply find the best
cloaking area for each request separately. For request
.u; xi ; yi ; ti ; ri /, we start at the leaf node in quadtree
T where the cells are smallest cloaking areas. First,
we find the leaf node which contains location of
.xi ; yi / and use it as the initial cloaking area, then
traverse the tree heading towards the root node (as
shown in Fig. 3b) until the privacy value of the current
cloaking area fulfills the requirement from the user.
This can guarantee that the generated cloaking area
is the smallest one satisfying the privacy requirement.

Algorithm 1 Cloaking Algorithm 1 for Basic L2P2
Input: A quadtree T , a footprint repository F , and a sequence
of m LBS requests .u; xi ; yi ; ti ; ri / (for i D 1 to m).
Output: A sequence of m cloaking areas ci (i D 1 to m).
1: for i D 1 to m do
2:
Find the leaf node c.ji ; L/ in quadtree T which contains
position of .xi ; yi /.
3:
Let ci D c.ji ; L/.
4:
while p.ci / < ri , i.e., the privacy value of ci does not
fulfill the privacy requirement ri do
5:
Let ci be the parent node of current ci in T . In other
words, move the cloaking area one level up in tree T
towards the root.
6:
end while
7: end for
8: Return c1 , c2 , : : : , cm .
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heuristics to reduce the complexity.
In this paper, we propose four different heuristics to
generate cloaking areas for enhanced L2P2. We use
Cloaking Algorithms 2 to 5 to denote them. These
heuristics share one basic idea: they all start from
initial cloaking areas at bottom of the quadtree T , and
iteratively move cloaking areas up along T to increase
the privacy values, until all cloaking areas fulfill the
user requirements. One key difference among these four
heuristics is the order of moving cloaking areas along
the quadtree. The first two heuristics move cloaking
areas in order while the latter two move cloaking areas
greedily based on certain criteria. All algorithms have
polynomial complexity of O.mL/.
The first algorithm (Algorithm 2) starts with the
output of Algorithm 1, since cloaking areas satisfying
the privacy requirements of enhanced L2P2 (with
respect to common users) must first satisfy the privacy
requirements for the corresponding basic L2P2. Then
the algorithm first expands the cloaking area c1 for the
1st request and checks whether the privacy values of all
requests are fulfilled. If not, it continues moving the
first cloaking area up until it reaches the root node. At
this point, if the requirements are not met yet, it begins
to move the cloaking area c2 for the 2nd request. This
process goes on until all requests are fulfilled. Note that
all requests can always be fulfilled when all cloaking
areas become the root node in the quadtree. Figure 4a
illustrates this algorithm (Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 2 Cloaking Algorithm 2 for Enhanced L2P2
Input: A quadtree T , a footprint repository F , and a sequence
of m LBS requests .u; xi ; yi ; ti ; ri /.
Output: A sequence of m cloaking areas ci (i D 1 to m).
1: Run Algorithm 1 for basic L2P2 to initialize c1 , : : : , cm .
2: Let i D 1.
3: while i  m do
4:
Let l D the level of ci in T .
5:
while l > 1 do
6:
Compute the privacy values p.c1 /, : : : , p.cm / with
respect to U 0 , where U 0 is the set of common users in
c1 , : : : , cm .
7:
if p.c1 /, : : : , p.cm / do not satisfy privacy requirements
r1 , : : : , rm then
8:
Move ci to be its direct parent in T and l D l 1.
9:
else
10:
Return c1 , c2 , : : : , cm .
11:
end if
12:
end while
13:
i D i C 1.
14: end while
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Algorithm 3 Cloaking Algorithm 3 for Enhanced L2P2
Input: A quadtree T , a footprint repository F , and a sequence
of m LBS requests .u; xi ; yi ; ti ; ri /.
Output: A sequence of m cloaking areas ci (i D 1 to m).
1: for i D 1 to m do
2:
Find leaf node c.ji ; L/ in quadtree T which contains
position of .xi ; yi /.
3:
Let ci D c.ji ; L/.
4: end for
5: Let l D L the height of quadtree T .
6: while l > 1 do
7:
Let i D 1.
8:
while i 6 m do
9:
Compute the privacy values p.c1 /, : : : , p.cm / with
respect to U 0 , where U 0 is the set of common users in
c1 , : : : , cm .
10:
if p.c1 /, : : : , p.cm / do not satisfy privacy requirements
r1 , : : : , rm then
11:
Move ci to be its direct parent in T .
12:
else
13:
Return c1 , c2 , : : : , cm .
14:
end if
15:
i D i C 1.
16:
end while
17:
l D l 1.
18: end while
Algorithm 4 Cloaking Algorithm 4 for Enhanced L2P2
Input: A quadtree T , a footprint repository F , and a sequence
of m LBS requests .u; xi ; yi ; ti ; ri /.
Output: A sequence of m cloaking areas ci (i D 1 to m).
1: Run Algorithm 1 for basic L2P2 to initialize c1 , : : : , cm .
2: Compute the privacy values p.c1 /, : : : , p.cm / with respect
to U 0 , where U 0 is the set of common users in c1 , : : : , cm .
3: while p.c1 /, : : : , p.cm / do not satisfy requirements r1 , : : : ,
rm do
4:
for i D 1 to m do
5:
Let ci0 be ci ’s direct parent in T .
6:
Compute the privacy values p.c1 /, : : : , p.ci0 /, : : : ,
p.cm / with respect to U 00 , where U 00 is the set of
common users in c1 , : : : , ci0 , : : : , cm . Note that if
p.cj / > rj , let p.cj / D rj .
P 1
P
7:
P Œi D ji D1
p.cj / C p.ci0 / C jmDiC1 p.cj /.
8:
end for
9:
Pick the index i which maximizes P Œi. If there is a tie,
pick the one with smallest i .
10:
Move ci to be its direct parent in T .
11: end while
12: Return c1 , c2 , : : : , cm .

The second algorithm (Algorithm 3) starts with
cloaking areas at the leaf node level. It first expands
the cloaking area c1 for the 1st request and checks
whether the privacy values of all requests are fulfilled.
If not, it moves the cloaking area c2 for the 2nd request
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Algorithm 5 Cloaking Algorithm 5 for Enhanced L2P2
Input: A quadtree T , a footprint repository F , and a sequence
of m LBS requests .u; xi ; yi ; ti ; ri /.
Output: A sequence of m cloaking areas ci (i D 1 to m).
1-6: same as Algorithm 4.
7:

P Œi  D

Pi

Pm
1
0
j D1 p.cj /Cp.ci /C j DiC1 p.cj /
Pm
1
0
a.c
/Ca.c
/C
j
j D1
j Di C1 a.cj /
i

Pi

.

8-12: same as Algorithm 4.

(a) Algorithm 2

5). See Fig. 4c for illustration. To be more specific,
for Algorithm 4, we pick the cloaking area whose
expansion can lead to maximum increase of privacy
values. While in Algorithm 5, we consider both privacy
and area increment, that is, we pick the cloaking area
whose expansion can lead to the maximum increase of
the ratio between total privacy values and total areas. If
there is a tie, our algorithms pick the cloaking area of
the earliest request.
In summary, the enhanced L2P2 problem is a very
challenging problem. A simple brute force method can
find the optimal solution, but have exponential time
complexity, which makes it very time-consuming in
practice especially when the number of LBS requests is
large. We propose four different heuristics, which can
find a sequence of cloaking areas in polynomial time to
fulfill the user requirements. Each of these heuristics
has a unique criterion to expand cloaking areas: either
following certain order as in Algorithm 2 or 3, or based
on privacy gain as in Algorithm 4 or 5.
4.3

(b) Algorithm 3

(c) Algorithms 4 & 5
Fig. 4 Illustrations of algorithms: Algorithms 2 and 3 raise
the cloaking area in order while Algorithms 4 and 5 raise the
cloaking area greedily based on certain privacy gain.

and checks whether all requests are fulfilled. This
process goes on until all requests are fulfilled. Figure 4b
illustrates this procedure, and the detailed algorithm is
given as Algorithm 3. This algorithm can guarantee that
the level difference among all generated cloaking areas
is within one in the quadtree T .
The third and fourth algorithms (Algorithms 4 and
5) are greedy-based algorithms, where they choose one
cloaking area (among all m cloaking areas) to expand
in each step. The choice of cloaking areas is based
on certain criteria/metrics (achieved privacy values or
ratios between total privacy values and total cloaking
areas, measured as P Œi  in Line 7 of Algorithm 4 or

Running example and discussions

Figure 5 illustrates a running example for our proposed
algorithms. In this example, three mobile users
fu1 ; u2 ; u3 g have footprints distributed in a square
region which is divided into a 3-level quadtree as shown
in Fig. 5a. Each colored triangle represents a footprint
of a mobile user. Different colors represent different
users. Five LBS requests are generated by user u1 (i.e.,
.u1 ; xi ; yi ; ti ; ri / for i D 1 to 5), which are represented
by footprints with a surrounding circle. We assume
that k-anonymity model is used and all ri D 2 (i.e.,
footprints of at least two (common) users are needed
in the cloaking area). For each LBS request, there
are three possible cloaking areas as shown in Fig. 5b.
L2P2 algorithms aim to generate five cloaking areas
(one for each LBS request) to fulfill the user’s privacy
requirements.
Figure 5c shows the output of Algorithm 1. Since
Algorithm 1 is only designed for the basic L2P2
problem where footprints of all users are considered,
each of the smallest cloaking area has already footprints
from two mobile users (including u1 itself). Therefore,
Algorithm 1 uses cloaking areas at Level 3 as the
output and it is the optimal solution for the basic
L2P2 problem. However, if we consider the enhanced
L2P2 problem, this output cannot fulfill the privacy
requirement since there is only one common user
among all generated cloaking areas.
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(a) 3-level quadtree and footprints of 3 users

(b) Solution space of cloaking areas for the 5 LBS requests from u1

(c) Output of Algorithm 1

(d) Output of Algorithms 2 and 4

(e) Output of Algorithms 3 and 5

(f) Optimal solution for enhanced L2B2
Fig. 5 Example of L2P2 problems for a sequence of 5 requests from u1 (footprints inside circles in (a) are the LBS requests
from u1 ). Here, we assume three mobile users fu1 ; u2 ; u3 g with all privacy requirements ri D 2 under k-anonymity model.

In Algorithm 2, each cloaking area is expanded to the
root of the quadtree before the next cloaking area begins
to expand until the privacy requirements are fulfilled.
Figure 5d shows the output. Clearly, when all of the
first three cloaking areas are expanded (the first two at
Level 1 and the third at Level 2), the common users are

fu1 ; u3 g, which satisfies the requirement.
In Algorithm 3, cloaking areas are expanded in turn
and the resulting cloaking areas are within one-level
difference for sure. Figure 5e shows the output. When
the first three cloaking areas are expanded to Level
2, the privacy requirements are fulfilled (with two
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common users fu1 ; u3 g already).
In Algorithm 4, in each step, the cloaking area whose
expansion can lead to maximum total privacy values is
chosen to expand. In this example, initially, expansion
of any cloaking area will not increase the privacy values.
Based on the tie-breaking rule, the first cloaking area is
selected to expand. Such situation repeats until both
cloaking areas of the first and second LBS requests are
at Level 1, then the cloaking area of the third LBS
request is selected to expand to Level 2 and the privacy
requirements are fulfilled. The output and the order
of expansions of Algorithm 4 are the same as those of
Algorithm 2, as shown in Fig. 5d.
Algorithm 5 considers the ratio between total privacy
values and total cloaking areas in each step when it
greedily selects the cloaking area to expand. Since the
area of cloaking areas at Level 2 is much smaller than
the area of cloaking areas at Level 1, Algorithm 5 will
pick a Level 2 cloaking area when the privacy values
are the same. Therefore, the output of Algorithm 5 is
the same as the one shown in Fig. 5e.
Via this simple running example, we can see that
all proposed enhanced L2P2 algorithms can fulfill the
privacy requirements. Algorithms 3 and 5 seem more
efficient than Algorithms 2 and 4 in term of the final
total/average area. However, all these algorithms may
not lead to optimal solution for the enhanced L2P2
problem. Figure 5f shows the optimal solution for this
running example, where the common users are fu1 ; u3 g,
and only two of cloaking areas are at Level 2 while
the others are at Level 3. On the other hand, the
enhanced L2P2 problem is indeed very challenging, and
the optimal solution is hard to find unless brute force
methods are used.
Since our proposed methods cannot solve the
enhanced L2P2 problem optimally, in the next section,
we evaluate these methods using large synthetic and
real-life location datasets of mobile users. Simulation
confirms that all these methods can fulfill diverse
privacy requirements, and two of them (Algorithms 3
and 5) can achieve this with just slight downgrade of the
quality of original location data (using small cloaking
areas).

5

Simulations

To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we
tested our algorithms extensively through a series
of simulations over two datasets (a synthetic dataset
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generated by a network-based traffic generator and a
real-life GPS tracing dataset).
5.1

Simulations over synthetic data

To generate the synthetic coordinates of mobile users
and their LBS requests, we use a network-based
generator of moving objects proposed and implemented
by Brinkhoff[10] . We randomly generate 1000 mobile
users and simulate their movement on the real road
map of Oldenberg, a city in Germany. For the moving
speeds, we use the default setting in the generator,
which changes users’ speeds at each intersection based
on the road type. We run the simulated 1000 mobile
users for 1000 unit time, which generates about
3:5  104 footprints with timestamp and location
information. Figure 6a shows the global and partial
views of the map of Oldenberg with footprints of mobile
users. All these footprints F are saved in MySQL
(http://www.mysql.com/) as a footprint database. We
implement all five proposed algorithms using Java as

(a)

(b)
Fig. 6 (a) Footprints of 1000 mobile users in the real
road map of Oldenberg, Germany, generated via the
genertator[10] . (b) Footprints of 33 000 taxis over 3 months in
the real-life T-Drive trajectory dataset[11, 12] over a road map
of Beijing, China. A subset of 10 357 taxis over one day within
a limited region (blue rectangle) is used in our simulations.
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the programming language.
We first build a 5-level quadtree T to divide the entire
16 km  16 km region of Oldenberg into different size
of cloaking areas. The smallest cloaking area at the
bottom of the tree T has a size of 1 km  1 km. We then
randomly choose a mobile user and generate its privacy
requirements. By applying the proposed algorithm, we
generate a sequence of cloaking areas for this mobile
user, and we verify (1) whether these cloaking areas
can satisfy the user’s privacy requirements and (2) how
efficient these cloaking areas are in term of their average
sizes. In other words, in this study, we are mainly
interested in the following two performance metrics.
One is cloaking area, i.e., the average area of generated
cloaking areas, and the other is privacy protection
level, i.e., the average privacy values achieved by
generated cloaking areas. It is obvious that we prefer
smaller cloaking area with larger privacy protection
level. For all simulations, we perform multiple rounds
over multiple users and report the average performance
metrics. In addition, we test all methods under both
onymity model[8] and entropy-based models[9] . Notice
that due to the difference between these two models, we
choose different mean values of privacy requirements in
our simulations.

Fig. 7
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Performance on basic L2P2 In the first set of
simulations, we consider the basic L2P2 problem
and evaluate the performance of our basic algorithm
(Algorithm 1) with different privacy requirements from
the user. We fix the number of requests of each user at
20 and the privacy requirements are randomly chosen
from a mean value from 5 to 10 for k-anonymity
model and from 5 to 20 for entropy-based model.
Figure 7 shows the detailed results. Here, we also run
Algorithm 1 with all privacy requirements set to be
the maximum value in the request sequence (denoted
as Algorithm 1-Max or Alg 1-Max), which represents
the previous work without considering diverse privacy
requirements. From Figs. 7a and 7c, we find that
Algorithm 1 uses much smaller cloaking areas than that
of Algorithm 1-Max. This confirms our conjecture that
considering the diverse privacy requirements can lead
to better quality of LBS services. In addition, we also
observe that the actual privacy protection levels from
Algorithm 1 are also smaller than that of Algorithm 1Max, as shown in Figs. 7b and 7d. (Obviously both
methods satisfy the user’s requirements because they
are above the line of required privacy values). Based on
these observations, it is desirable to have L2P2 solutions
to efficiently protect mobile user’s location privacy in

(a) Cloaking area for k-anonymity

(b) Privacy level for k-anonymity

(c) Cloaking area for entropy-based

(d) Privacy level for entropy-based

Results of algorithms for basic L2P2 with different privacy requirements over the synthetic dataset.
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LBS.
Performance on enhanced L2P2: Effect of privacy
requirements In the second set of simulations, we
focus on the enhanced L2P2 problem (where only
common users are counted for privacy calculation) and
evaluate the other four proposed methods (Algorithms
2, 3, 4, and 5), with the similar setting to the first set
of simulations. From Figs. 8a and 8c, we find that all
these algorithms need larger cloaking areas to protect
the user privacy, compared with that of Algorithm
1. This is because only common users are counted
for privacy calculation in Algorithms 2 to 5, while
Algorithm 1 considers all users. In addition, Algorithms
3 and 5 use much smaller cloaking areas, compared with
Algorithms 2 and 4. This tells us that Algorithms 3 and
5 are more efficient in term of the quality of cloaking
areas generated. All methods need larger areas when
users have higher privacy requirements. From Figs. 8b
and 8d, it is clear that all methods can satisfy the privacy
requirements over common user set, and the privacy
protection level increases along with the increment of
privacy requirements from users.
Performance on enhanced L2P2: Effect of request
sequence length In the third set of simulations, we
would like to see how different sequence length of

Fig. 8

LBS requests (i.e., different numbers of LBS requests)
affect our results. We fix the privacy requirement with
mean of 7 for k-anonymity model and 12 for entropybased model, then increase the number of LBS requests
from 10 to 50 for both models. Figure 9 shows the
results. From Figs. 9a and 9c, we observe that with
the increase of LBS requests, Algorithms 3 and 5
consistently outperform Algorithms 2 and 4, in terms
of average cloaking areas. However, in Figs. 9b and 9d,
in term of average achieved privacy values, we do not
see a clear trend here. We believe that this is because
when more LBS requests are involved, the computation
of common user sets is affected by more cloaking areas.
Any user change in any cloaking area would impact
the privacy value computation, which makes this issue
more complicated.
Performance on enhanced L2P2: Comparison
with optimal solutions In the last set of simulations,
we compare solutions from all algorithms with
the optimal solution obtained by a brute force
method. Since the brute force method has exponential
complexity, we use just 7 LBS requests in this set
of simulations. Again, the privacy requirements are
randomly chosen from a mean value from 5 to 9 for kanonymity model and from 12 to 25 for entropy-based

(a) Cloaking area for k-anonymity

(b) Privacy level for k-anonymity

(c) Cloaking area for entropy-based

(d) Privacy level for entropy-based

Results of algorithms for enhanced L2P2 with different privacy requirements over the synthetic dataset.
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Fig. 9

(a) Cloaking area for k-anonymity

(b) Privacy level for k-anonymity

(c) Cloaking area for entropy-based

(d) Privacy level for entropy-based

Results of algorithms for enhanced L2P2 with different number of LBS requests over the synthetic dataset.

model. Figure 10 illustrates the results. It is clear that
the optimal solution outperforms all enhanced L2P2
algorithms (Algorithms 2 to 5), and the solutions of
Algorithms 3 and 5 are very near the optimal solution
while both algorithms have polynomial complexity,
which is much more efficient than the brute force
method.
Notice that the enhanced L2P2 problem is much
stronger than the basic one, thus may cause larger
cloaking areas. Therefore, we suggest that the user
should not use large m or high r in their system. Here,
we use large m in simulations to illustrate the power of
enhanced L2P2 over basic L2P2.
5.2
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Simulations over real-life tracing data

We also test our proposed algorithms over a real-world
trajectory dataset provided in Refs. [11, 12]: T-Drive
taxi trajectory dataset. This dataset was generated by
over 33 000 taxis in a period of 3 months in Beijing,
China. Figure 6b shows a plot of all footprints over
the map of Beijing. We use a sample dataset from
T-Drive dataset that contains one-week trajectories of
10 357 taxis for our simulations and treat each taxi
as a mobile user. The total number of footprints in

this dataset is about 15 million. The average interval
between two footprints is 3:1 minutes and the average
distance between them is 600 meters. To reduce the
number of footprints, we only use the footprints of
one particular day (February 4, 2008) and limit the
region to a rectangle as shown in Fig. 6b (i.e., all
footprints have their latitudes within Œ116:35ı ; 116:45ı 
and longitudes within Œ39:90ı ; 39:95ı ). The area of this
entire region is around 8:52 km  6:56 km, and it covers
the center city of Beijing. We build a 6-level quadtree
T to divide the selected region into different sizes of
cloaking areas. The smallest cloaking area has a size of
0:27 km  0:21 km roughly.
Again, we randomly choose multiple mobile users
and generate their privacy requirements. We fix the
number of requests of each user at 20 and the privacy
requirements are randomly chosen from a mean value
from 2 to 7 for k-anonymity model and from 3 to 7 for
entropy-based model. Figure 11 shows the simulation
results of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 1-Max over the
basic L2P2 problem. It is clear that by considering
diverse privacy requirements Algorithm 1 can lead to
smaller cloaking area while satisfying the user’s privacy
requirement. Figure 12 shows the simulation results
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Fig. 10

(a) Cloaking area for k-anonymity

(b) Privacy level for k-anonymity

(c) Cloaking area for entropy-based

(d) Privacy level for for entropy-based

Results of algorithms for enhanced L2P2 compared with the optimal solutions over the synthetic dataset.

of Algorithms 2–5 over the enhanced L2P2 problem.
Again, all conclusions are consistent with those
in simulations with synthetic dataset. All proposed
algorithms can satisfy the privacy requirements over
common users. Algorithms 3 and 5 are much more
efficient (in term of the average area of the cloaking
areas) than Algorithms 2 and 4. This is more obvious
than in simulations with synthetic dataset, since more
levels in the quadtree are used in this set of simulations.
This also makes the difference between Algorithms 3
and 5 hardly seen in Figs. 12a and 12c. In summary,
the proposed algorithms (especially Algorithms 3 and
5) can indeed fulfill diverse privacy requirements with
slight downgrade of the quality of original location data.

6

Conclusion

With the increasing importance of user location privacy
issues, many approaches have been proposed to protect
mobile users’ location information. However, we
observe that these existing approaches usually assume
that users’ privacy requirements are constant, which
may not always be true in real-life scenarios. In
this paper, observing that a mobile user’s privacy

requirements can be dynamic and diverse, we formalize
this as the L2P2 problem. We further classify
L2P2 problems into basic L2P2 and enhanced L2P2
problems. The difference between basic and enhanced
L2P2 lies in whether the common users or all users
in a sequence of cloaking areas would be used
for privacy computation. For basic L2P2, a simple
algorithm (Algorithm 1) can easily solve the problem.
While for enhanced L2P2, we propose four heuristics
(Algorithms 2 to 5) to generate cloaking areas to satisfy
users’ privacy requirements, where each heuristic
has a different, unique criterion to expand cloaking
areas. To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed
algorithms, we preform extensive simulations over both
synthetic and real-life datasets, and several interesting
observations have been reported.
There are a few directions we will investigate in our
future work. First, for enhanced L2P2 problem, in this
paper we only propose four heuristics to address it, and
performances of these four heuristics are very different.
We will propose and investigate other heuristics in our
future work. Second, we will test our proposed methods
over other location data sets and try different location
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Fig. 11

(a) Cloaking area for k-anonymity

(b) Privacy level for k-anonymity

(c) Cloaking area for entropy-based

(d) Privacy level for entropy-based

Results of algorithms for basic L2P2 with different privacy requirements over the real-life T-Drive taxi dataset.

privacy measurements (beyond privacy requirement and
total area of cloaking areas, such as those used in
Refs. [28, 29]) or different location query models (such
as those considered in Ref. [30]). Third, here we do
not study how the proposed methods perform under
different localizations or tracking attacks. More formal
investigation on threat models and evaluations will
be preformed in our future work. Last, we are also
interested in investigating other types of location-based
privacy, such as considering the content of actual query
which is beyond just the location.
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